Flere og flere finner nå ut at kvotesystemet for CO2 ikke fungerer.
Rapporten fra House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee finner du her.
Tim Yeo MP, komitéformann sier:
"Emissions trading should be helping us to combat climate change, but at the moment the price of carbon simply isn't high enough to make it work."
"The recession has left many big firms with more carbon allowances than they need and carbon prices have collapsed."
Fornybar-bransjen oppsummerer:
— European carbon markets are failing to deliver significant carbon-savings in Europe.
— European carbon markets are failing to provide a high or reliable enough cost of carbon to justify substantial investment in carbon-reducing measures in Europe.
— The period since the Kyoto agreement and the introduction of international carbon markets has coincided with an acceleration in the rate of increase of carbon emissions.
— One factor in that acceleration is the offshoring of manufacture to less-efficient producers in developing nations.
— European emissions increased in parallel with the process of offshoring, when they should have reduced.
— Before Kyoto, emissions were reducing as GDP was increasing. Since Kyoto, emissions have increased at a fraction of the rate of increase of GDP. Carbon markets have had an insignificant impact on this relationship.
— A rational and effective carbon-pricing mechanism would impose an equal cost of carbon on all sources and sinks. Cap-and-trade cannot do so because it does not scale down.
— Correcting this deficiency by combining with other measures is economically-ineffcient.
— Low prices in the EU-ETS are the result of inevitable political gaming, not of delivery.
— Low prices in the EU-ETS have a negative impact on sectors outside the EU-ETS.
— Free allocation and auctioning of credits both have anti-competitive consequences.
— Linking the EU-ETS with an American scheme would result in Europe paying the USA for soft savings, while American businesses continued to benefit from looser standards.
— Many CDM and offset schemes provide illusory benefits.
— Carbon budgets on a national level may be incompatible with trading mechanisms and utilities that are international.
— Cap-and-trade is wrong in principle as well as practice, and cannot be made to work effectively.
— Cap-and-trade and Kyoto should be replaced with carbon tax and an international risk-based market.
Oljeselskapet Shell mener alikevel:
— Carbon markets, such as the EU ETS, are effcient mechanisms for incentivising CO2 reductions in the power and large industrial sectors.
— Emissions trading schemes deliver an environmental outcome at lowest cost to the economy; the cap ensures that overall level of CO2 is restricted while trading allows the market to find the least cost pathway to delivering the cap.
Og det er jo problemet. Alle som ikke ønsker en reduksjon i bruk av fossilenergi er meget optimistiske til kvotemarkedet. Dette inkluderer også Statoil og den norske stat. Det alene burde jo gjøre oss skeptiske til systemet i utgangspunktet. Formålet er altså å kutte i utslipp fra fossilenergi, og lykkes det i vesentlig grad vil jo nettopp oljeselskapene gå konkurs! Hvordan kan de da være så positive?
Fordi de lenge har visst at kvotesystemet ikke vil fungere selvsagt!
Erfaringene er uansett entydige. Karbonmarkedet fungerer ikke. Ikke uten at prisene justeres kraftig opp, og antallet kvoter senkes. Men da vil jo fornybar energi faktisk utkonkurrere fossilenergi, og det er overtydelig at det ønskes ikke.
Hva var det vi sa?
Rapporten fra House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee finner du her.
Tim Yeo MP, komitéformann sier:
"Emissions trading should be helping us to combat climate change, but at the moment the price of carbon simply isn't high enough to make it work."
"The recession has left many big firms with more carbon allowances than they need and carbon prices have collapsed."
Fornybar-bransjen oppsummerer:
— European carbon markets are failing to deliver significant carbon-savings in Europe.
— European carbon markets are failing to provide a high or reliable enough cost of carbon to justify substantial investment in carbon-reducing measures in Europe.
— The period since the Kyoto agreement and the introduction of international carbon markets has coincided with an acceleration in the rate of increase of carbon emissions.
— One factor in that acceleration is the offshoring of manufacture to less-efficient producers in developing nations.
— European emissions increased in parallel with the process of offshoring, when they should have reduced.
— Before Kyoto, emissions were reducing as GDP was increasing. Since Kyoto, emissions have increased at a fraction of the rate of increase of GDP. Carbon markets have had an insignificant impact on this relationship.
— A rational and effective carbon-pricing mechanism would impose an equal cost of carbon on all sources and sinks. Cap-and-trade cannot do so because it does not scale down.
— Correcting this deficiency by combining with other measures is economically-ineffcient.
— Low prices in the EU-ETS are the result of inevitable political gaming, not of delivery.
— Low prices in the EU-ETS have a negative impact on sectors outside the EU-ETS.
— Free allocation and auctioning of credits both have anti-competitive consequences.
— Linking the EU-ETS with an American scheme would result in Europe paying the USA for soft savings, while American businesses continued to benefit from looser standards.
— Many CDM and offset schemes provide illusory benefits.
— Carbon budgets on a national level may be incompatible with trading mechanisms and utilities that are international.
— Cap-and-trade is wrong in principle as well as practice, and cannot be made to work effectively.
— Cap-and-trade and Kyoto should be replaced with carbon tax and an international risk-based market.
Oljeselskapet Shell mener alikevel:
— Carbon markets, such as the EU ETS, are effcient mechanisms for incentivising CO2 reductions in the power and large industrial sectors.
— Emissions trading schemes deliver an environmental outcome at lowest cost to the economy; the cap ensures that overall level of CO2 is restricted while trading allows the market to find the least cost pathway to delivering the cap.
Og det er jo problemet. Alle som ikke ønsker en reduksjon i bruk av fossilenergi er meget optimistiske til kvotemarkedet. Dette inkluderer også Statoil og den norske stat. Det alene burde jo gjøre oss skeptiske til systemet i utgangspunktet. Formålet er altså å kutte i utslipp fra fossilenergi, og lykkes det i vesentlig grad vil jo nettopp oljeselskapene gå konkurs! Hvordan kan de da være så positive?
Fordi de lenge har visst at kvotesystemet ikke vil fungere selvsagt!
Erfaringene er uansett entydige. Karbonmarkedet fungerer ikke. Ikke uten at prisene justeres kraftig opp, og antallet kvoter senkes. Men da vil jo fornybar energi faktisk utkonkurrere fossilenergi, og det er overtydelig at det ønskes ikke.
Hva var det vi sa?
4 kommentarer:
Det illustrerer jo Norges dilemma alt for tydelig: Tjene penger på fossilt brensel, og samtidig få ned det globale utslippet. Resultatet er nok upassende, men burde ikke overraske.
Fred Rune,
Nei, dette burde ikke overraske. Det har hele tiden ligget i kortene at spesiellt kvoteantallet har vært for høyt - og ingen land ser ut til å være villige til å redusere kvotene til under dagens forbruk = utslipp kan fortsette som før.
Norges dilemma er klart. Enten høyere pris på forbruk av olje - som vil slå hardt ut spesiellt for den norkse oljen som er dyrere å produsere enn gulf-olje generellt, eller business as usual.
Og da velges business as usual, selv om man selvsagt ikke sier det.
Absurditeten er på nivå med fiksjonens Catch-22:
Det fantes bare en paragraf, og det var paragraf 22, som sa at bekymring for ens egen sikkerhet overfor virkelige og overhengende farer var et produkt av en fornuftig tankeprosess. Orr var sinnssyk og kunne bli fritatt. Alt han hadde å gjøre var å be om det, men så snart han gjorde det, var han ikke lenger sinnssyk og måtte fortsette å fly. Orr måtte være sinnssyk for å fortsette å fly og frisk hvis han ikke gjorde det, men hvis han var frisk, måtte han fly. Hvis han fløy, var han sinnssyk og behøvde ikke å gjøre det, men hvis han ikke ville, var han frisk og måtte. Yossarian var dypt grepet av paragraf 22s innlysende klarhet og plystret imponert.
Skal bli interessant å se om Norge nå krever justeringer, eller om de rødgrønne beviser at miljøengasjementet er bløff.
Kurt,
De rødgrønne har som mål å redde norsk oljeindustri, og vil selvsagt bruke allverdens tid til å finne ut at ingen tiltak virker.
Ikke før norsk oljeproduksjon går nedover av seg selv vil vi få kutt.
Det vil si, det vil heller ikke skje, fordi da blokkerer internasjonal oljeindustri veien videre.
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